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the trial judge was mere dictum, and did not purport to decide any equal
protection issue.
The Missouri Supreme Court could have disposed of appellant's argument in a much more straightforward manner simply by noting that not all
sexual psychopaths are treatable. There is a rational basis for committing
treatable sexual psychopaths, while subjecting nontreatable sexual
psychopaths to the ordinary criminal process. Hence, it is consistent with
equal protection to vest discretion in the trial judge to determine whether a
given sexual psychopath is, in fact, treatable. 41 Of course, the validity of
such an argument would rest on two premises: (1) that the trial judge
actually considers treatability in his decision whether to commit, and (2)
that treatment is actually forthcoming to those who are committed.
Thus, while the court was correct in rejecting the particular argument
raised, its reasoning was nebulous and unsatisfactory. It is also disturbing
that the court is willing to cite cases from the 1950's as settling all constitutional issues. Courts nationwide are grappling with the complex questions
surrounding the rights of the mentally deficient. The Missouri Supreme
Court, by failing to do the same, has merely deferred the problems to the
future.
MICHAEL W. RHODES

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-ENFORCEMENT OF
MAINTENANCE AND SUPPORT ORDERS BY
CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS-IMPRISONMENT
FOR DEBT
State ex rel. Stanhope v. Pratt'
A marriage dissolution decree required relator to make monthly
maintenance payments to his ex-wife through the circuit court clerk. Re41. Similarly under § 211.071, RSMo 1969, juvenile courts have discretion to
remove a juvenile offender from the special juvenile system and certify him for
prosecution under the general criminal law. When this provision was challenged as
denying equal protection to a juvenile certified for prosecution, the Missouri
Supreme Court upheld the classification as rationally distinguishing between those
juveniles who "may be reclaimed through reformatory measures" and those who
are likely to be incorrigible. State exrel. Boyd v. Rutledge, 321 Mo. 1090, 1102, 13
S.W.2d 1061, 1066 (En Banc 1929). The Missouri Supreme Court has noted that
the theoretical basis for the sexual psychopath statute is similar to that of the
Juvenile Code. State ex rel. Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 1253, 232 S.W.2d 897,
900 (En Banc 1950).
1. 533 S.W.2d 567 (Mo. En Banc 1976).
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lator failed to make the payments, and the prosecuting attorney filed a
contempt motion pursuant to section 452.3452 of the new dissolution
statute.3 At the conclusion of the hearing, respondent judge found relator
guilty of contempt and threatened to impose a sixty-day jail sentence,
suspended subject to relator's compliance with the maintenance order. 4
Entry of judgment was delayed to enable relator to seek a writ of prohibition from the Missouri Supreme Court.'
Relator argued that imprisonment for contempt for failure to comply
with the court's maintenance order is imprisonment for debt in violation of
the Missouri constitution, 6 and that section 452.345 which authorizes such
contempt proceedings is therefore unconstitutional. The supreme court
held that trial courts are empowered to imprison for contempt in appropriate cases to enforce maintenance and support orders. Such attachment is
not imprisonment for debt within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition, and section 452.345 is therefore constitutional. 7
Prior Missouri law was based upon Coughlin v. Ehlert8 which held that
an order to pay alimony was simply an order to pay money. Imprisonment
for failure to pay was unconstitutional as imprisonment for debt. The
obligee was, in effect, a judgment creditor with all the remedies available to
judgment creditors, 9 but the courts were denied contempt proceedings as a
remedy for enforcement.' 0
Coughlin was gradually eroded by subsequent analagous decisions of
the appellate courts' I and by state legislation.' 2 With the enactment of the
2. Section 452.345, RSMo (1973 Supp.), provides in part:
4. If a party fails to make required payment, the circuit clerk shall
send ... notice of the arrearage to the obligor. If payment of the sum due
is not made to the circuit clerk within ten days. . . ,the circuit clerk shall
certify the amount due to the prosecuting attorney. The prosecuting
attorney shall, with the consent of the obligee, promptly initiate contempt
proceedings against the obligor.
3. §§ 452.300-.415, RSMo (1973 Supp.).
4. Imprisonment is commonly used in civil contempt cases. The contemner is
either held until he purges himself of contempt, or, less often, he may be given a
definite sentence that is then suspended on condition that he comply with the
court's order. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 183, 267-68
(1971).
5. Prohibition is not an appropriate remedy for review of contempt judgments relating to failure to pay maintenance or support. State ex rel. McCurley v.
Hanna, 535 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Mo. En Banc 1976).
6. MO. CONsT. art. I, § 11 provides: "That no person shall be imprisoned for
debt, except for nonpayment of fines and penalties imposed by law."
7. State ex rel. Stanhope v. Pratt, 533 S.W.2d 567, 575 (Mo. En Banc 1976).
8. 39 Mo. 285 (1866), overruled, 533 S.W.2d 567, 574 (Mo. En Banc 1976).
9. Nelson v. Nelson, 282 Mo. 412,422, 221 S.W. 1066, 1069 (En Banc 1920).
10. Partney v. Partney, 442 S.W.2d 117 (St. L. Mo. App. 1969); Davis v.
Broughton, 382 S.W.2d 219 (Spr. Mo. App. 1964); Harrington v. Harrington, 233
Mo. App. 390, 121 S.W.2d 291 (K.C. Ct. App. 1938); Exparte Kinsolving, 135 Mo.
App. 631, 116 S.W. 1068 (St. L. Ct. App. 1909). All of the above overruled, 533
S.W.2d 567, 574 (Mo. En Banc 1976).
11. State v. Davis, 469 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1971) (imprisonment for criminal
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss2/9
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Missouri Divorce Reform Act, I3 trial courts were specifically empowered
for the first time to enforce payment of maintenance and support by
contempt proceedings. The Missouri Bar Family Law Committee, which
proposed the contempt provision to the legislature, apparently hoped the
new procedure would spawn a test case. 4
The Stanhope court expressly overruled Coughlin and the appellate
court cases that followed it.' 5 In recognizing imprisonment for contempt as
a constitutional remedy for the enforcement of maintenance and support
orders, Missouri law is now in conformity with the other forty-nine states
and the District of Columbia. 16 The frequently expressed rationale is that
an order to pay maintenance is something more than an ordinary debt or
money judgment: it is an order to the obligor to perform a public as well as
a marital duty; a duty enforced by imprisonment if necessary to prevent
the obligee from becoming a public charge or dependent upon the charity
7
of relatives and friends.'
The Stanhope court was careful to limit the application of this "rather
drastic remedy." First, before ordering imprisonment, trial courts should
be "convinced" that the obligor is "financially able" to make the required
payment or that he has "intentionally and contumaciously" placed himself
in a position so that he could not comply (emphasis added).' 8 The practical
effect of this requirement is unclear. Virtually all courts would agree that
imprisonment for contempt is inappropriate when the obligor is neither
able to pay nor guilty of voluntarily creating the inability for the purpose of
avoiding payment; but the limits of judicial discretion beyond this narrow
common ground are not uniformly defined.
It can be argued that Stanhope authorizes trial courts to punish by
contempt for nonsupport); Zeitinger v. Mitchell, 244 S.W.2d 91 (Mo. 1951) (imprisonment for contempt for nondelivery of funds due an estate); State v. Taylor, 335
Mo. 460, 73 S.W.2d 378 (En Banc 1934) (imprisonment for fraudulently passing an
insufficient funds check to pay past due account); Exparte Fuller, 330 Mo. 371, 50
S.W.2d 654 (En Banc 1932) (imprisonment for contempt for nondelivery of goods
and proceeds to receiver); In re Knaup, 144 Mo. 653,46 S.W.151 (1898) (imprisonment for contempt for nondelivery of bonds); Exparte Fowler, 221 Mo. App. 325,
273 S.W. 195 (K.C. Ct. App. 1925) (imprisonment for contempt for nondelivery of
funds to administrators); Ex parte Devoy, 208 Mo. App. 550, 236 S.W. 1070 (St. L.
Ct. App. 1921) (imprisonment for contempt for nondelivery of possession of house
to receiver).
12. § 559.353, RSMo 1969 (criminal nonsupport statute); § 454.240, RSMo
1969 (as part of Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law, empowers
courts to punish for contempt when acting as responding state); § 476.110, RSMo
1969 (empowers trial courts to punish for criminal contempt those in wilful disobedience of their orders).
13. §§ 452.300-.415, RSMo (1973 Supp.). See statute quoted note 2 supra.
14. Ruhland, Maintenance and Support, 29 J. Mo. B. 516, 518 (1973).
15. 533 S.W.2d at 574.
16. Id. See Schoenlaub, Use of Contempt Powers in the Enforcement of Alimony
and Support Decrees, 23 J. Mo. B. 396 (1967).
17. See, e.g., West v. West, 126 Va. 696, 699, 101 S.E. 876, 877 (1920).
18. 533 S.W.2d at 575.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1977

3

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [1977], Art. 9
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

imprisonment for contempt those obligors who default on their maintenance and support obligations, a finding of financial inability to comply
notwithstanding, if the evidence discloses that the inability was willfully
created.' 9 However, contempt proceedings are civil and thus remedial in
nature.20 Such contempt orders compel obedience to the courts' orders
rather than vindicate the courts' authority by inflicting punishment. Consequently, it is held that the contemner must be able to purge himself of the
contempt by compliance. 2 1 To the extent, therefore, that this approach
allows imprisonment as mere punishment in the absence of ability to pay, it
seems inconsistent with the avowed purpose of the remedy which is to
collect accrued maintenance or support.
A more fruitful and moderate interpretation would involve broadening the concept of financial ability beyond present means to overall capacity
to comply. It has long been the rule in Missouri that in determining the
proper amount of the original maintenance or support award, courts will
accept evidence of past income and reasonable prospects for future earn22
ings, as well as evidence of present income, to establish capacity to pay.
Under this view, trial courts would disallow a defense of present inability
when, as in Stanhope, the evidence reveals both a voluntary reduction of
income for the purpose of avoiding payment and an ability to earn more in
the future. 23 The courts' ability to enforce their maintenance and support
orders would consequently be strengthened by extending their reach to the
indolent and disingenuous who are capable of satisfying their obligations
2 4
but lack the immediate monetary resources.
19. Although there is language in the opinion seemingly authorizing courts to
"punish by imprisonment for contempt" in such cases, few jurisdictions appear
ready to extend judicial discretion that far. But see Barclay v. Barclay, 184 Ill. 471,
475-76, 56 N.E. 821, 822 (1900); Cannon v. Cannon, 34 Tenn. App. 568, 573, 241
S.W.2d 435, 437 (1951).
20. Teefey v. Teefey, 533 S.W.2d 563, 566 (Mo. En Banc 1976).
21. See Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911); Mechanic
v. Gruensfelder, 461 S.W.2d 298 (St. L. Mo. App. 1970).
22. Richardson v. Richardson, 524 S.W.2d 149, 153 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1975); Fugate v. Fugate, 510 S.W.2d 705,706 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974); Rutlader v.
Rudader, 411 S.W.2d 826, 829 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967); Weiss v. Weiss, 392 S.W.2d
646, 647 (St. L. Mo. App. 1965); Lampman v. Lampman, 367 S.W.2d 28, 30 (St. L.
Mo. App. 1963); McCarthy v. McCarthy, 329 S.W.2d 236, 241 (St. L. Mo. App.
1959).
23. The Stanhope court found, inter alia,that relator had accepted the responsibility of a new wife and child a mere thirty-one days after the divorce, bidded on
and maintained a lesser paying job when he had the ability and capacity to earn
more, and taken a greatly exaggerated number of personal leaves without explanation totaling twenty percent of his employable time and thereby reducing his
earnings. 533 S.W.2d at 570.
24. Although courts cannot force recalcitrant obligors to work to capacity,
they can disallow a defense of inability when appropriate. Note that in determining
overall capacity to pay, trial courts run the risk of jailing one who is genuinely
unable to comply. However, this may be more a theoretical than practical problem
since an expression of willingness to obey is often sufficient to avoid confinement.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss2/9
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The dissent took the view, followed in a few jurisdictions, 25 that for the
purpose of civil contempt proceedings to compel payment of accrued
maintenance or support, present lack of means is a complete defense,
notwithstanding the fact that past failure to pay was inexcusable. Because
this is civil contempt, the contemner must, at the time cited, be able to
purge himself of the contempt by the performance of some act then and
there within his power. 26 Coughlin would therefore be limited by the dissent
to cases in which the obligor does not have the money for the required
payment in his immediate possession or control. It is unlikely, however,
that trial courts will accept the dissent's restrictions. Such an approach
weakens the effectiveness of the remedy by ignoring both the reasons for
and the permanency of the present inability, limiting the courts' reach to
27
those with the requisite cash reserves.
A further question raised by Stanhope involves clarification of the
circumstances under which Missouri courts are likely to make a finding of
financial ability to comply. The hodgepodge of case and statutory law in
other jurisdictions provides no clear set of standards. Indeed, the courts
appear jealous of their discretion and reluctant to limit it with rigid
guidelines. 28 Nevertheless, some recurrent patterns emerge. The courts
are less likely, for example, to allow a defense of present inability when it
appears that there has been material income such that some payments
could have been made and were not,29 there has been a refusal to work and
earn to capacity,30 or the present inability has resulted from obligations
incurred by remarriage. 3' All of these factors influenced the Stanhope
court.

32

As to the quantum of evidence necessary to establish financial inability,
See Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 183, 267-69, 272
(1971).
25. See, e.g., Sears v. Sears, 43 N.M. 142, 145, 87 P.2d 434,436 (1939); Snook
v. Snook, 110 Wash. 310, 313-15, 188 P. 502, 503 (1920).
26. 533 S.W.2d at 576.
27. Much of the disagreement between the majority and dissent stemmed
from the trial court's failure to clearly state whether its finding of present ability
referred to payment of the arrears, the next installment, or both. As a result, relator
did not know exactly what was required to purge himself of contempt. If imprisonment for civil contempt is designed to coerce payment, then it would seem that the
contempt order should clearly specify the amount contemner must pay and at what
intervals.
28. See generally Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 183
(1971).
29. See, e.g., Lusty v. Lusty, 70 Idaho 382, 385, 387, 219 P.2d 280, 282-83
(1950); Bailey v. Bailey, 77 S.D. 546, 549, 95 N.W.2d 533, 533-35 (1959).
30. .Kelly v. Kelly, 137 F.2d 254 (D.C. Cir. 1943); Wohlfort v. Wohlfort, 116
Kan. 154, 163, 225 P. 746, 750 (1924).
31. Kephart v. Kephart, 193 F.2d 677, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 944 (1952); Kelm v. Kelm, 83 Colo. 277, 279, 263 P. 716, 717 (1928); State ex
rel. Brown v. Brown, 31 Wash. 397, 405, 72 P. 86, 88-89 (1903).
32. See note 23 supra.
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Missouri law is unsettled.3 3 In most jurisdictions the problem is addressed
by placing the burden of proof as to inability on the obligor.34 The movant
need not aver ability to pay; a prima facie case of contempt is made by
showing both the order for the payment of maintenance or support and
the default.3 5 At least one jurisdiction, however, places the burden on the
obligee.

36

The other major limitation imposed by Stanhope on the use of contempt proceedings to enforce payment of maintenance and support would
allow trial courts to require that the person seeking the contempt order
exercise "reasonable efforts" to collect by the "conventional remedies available"37 before entering the contempt order. 38 Perhaps the most promising
method of collection is the new statutory remedy provided by section
452.350, RSMo 1973 Supp., 39 which empowers trial courts to order an
assignment of part of the obligor's future earnings or other income to the
obligee. Payments may be made directly to the obligee from the obligor's
employer or other payor. This not only provides a reasonably effective
method for collecting the arrears, but it also gives the obligee some assurance of regular and adequate future installments. It is suggested that this
remedy be considered first when collection of maintenance or support is a
problem. If the obligor should refuse to execute the assignment, imprisonment for contempt might well prove the appropriate means of coercing
40
compliance.
Finally, the practitioner should keep in mind that contempt proceedings need not be brought under section 452.345.41 The Missouri Supreme
33. In Teefey v. Teefey, 533 S.W.2d 563, 567 (Mo. En Banc 1976), a companion case to Stanhope, the Missouri Supreme Court declined to decide the burden of
proof as to financial inability to comply.
34. Ex parte Risner, 67 Cal. App. 2d 806, 155 P.2d 667 (1945); Garza v.
Fleming, 323 S.W.2d 152 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); see Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 591, 607
(1957).
35. This rule is based upon the practical proposition that the facts as to ability
to pay are peculiarly within the obligor's own knowledge. In many jurisdictions
there is, in addition, a presumption that in fixing the amount of maintenance or
support to be paid, the court fully investigated and came up with a reasonable
figure.
36. Wright v. Wright, 132 Neb. 619, 623, 272 N.W. 568, 570 (1937).
37. Enforcement by execution has been the most frequently used method of
collection. See 2 W. NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT §§ 16.40-.56 (2d rev. ed.
1961).
38. 533 S.W.2d at 576.
39. Section 452.350, RSMo (1975 Supp.), provides in part:
The court may order the person obligated to pay support or maintenance to make an assignment of a part of his periodic earnings or other
income to the person entitled to receive the payments or to the circuit clerk
as trustee for such person . .

.

. The payor shall withhold from such

earnings or other income the amount specified in the assignment and shall
transmit the payments to the person specified in the order. ...
40. 533 S.W.2d at 577.
41. Contempt proceedings are available under § 452.345 RSMO (1975 Supp.),
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol42/iss2/9
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